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JUDGE, JURY, AND EXECUTIONER:  ROGER 
GOODELL AND THE POWER TO PUNISH 
Ursula Petersen* 
This Note examines the unbridled disciplinary powers granted to NFL 
Commissioner Roger Goodell.  These powers, granted by the NFL’s 
Collective Bargaining Agreement, allow Goodell to indiscriminately punish 
NFL players for violent, off-field behavior.  The increased media coverage 
of domestic violence and sexual assault—perpetrated by NFL players—has 
damaged the NFL’s public persona and resulted in loss of sponsorship.  In 
response, Goodell has pledged to deter violent behavior and punish player 
indiscretions by crafting and implementing harsher Personal Conduct 
Policies.  
This Note explores the history of NFL disciplinary policies and the 
legal challenges to Goodell’s disciplinary powers.  Additionally, this Note 
looks at how NFL players escape criminal punishment for violent conduct, 
the effect on their victims, and how the cycle of off-field player violence is 
continued.  This Note concludes by proposing different and more proactive 
means by which Commissioner Goodell can exercise his power to more 
appropriately address, punish, and prevent violent player conduct. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 * J.D. Candidate at Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, 2018.  The author would like to thank 
Professor Gary Craig and the Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review for their 
dedication to and work on this Note.  Additionally, the author would like to thank her parents, Tom 
and Kathleen Petersen, for their patience, support, and words of encouragement. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The National Football League (NFL) is widely regarded as a staple of 
American home life; watching football is about as American as apple pie.  
The 2015 Super Bowl was the most watched television event in U.S. history.1  
In recent years, however, the NFL has been scrutinized for a growing 
problem within the League: violent crime.  Prior to 2014, NFL players were 
arrested, on average, more often than their National Basketball Association 
(NBA), National Hockey League (NHL), and Major League Baseball (MLB) 
counterparts.2  With respect to domestic violence specifically, the arrest rate 
among NFL players was second only to that of the NBA.3  Since 2014, 108 
NFL players have been arrested, and twenty-nine of these arrests were for 
violent offenses such as rape, domestic violence, assault, and battery.4  Yet, 
from 2006 to 2014, the League allowed 34 of the 57 reported domestic 
violence incidents to go unpunished.5 
However, 2014 marked a year of change for the NFL’s policies on 
personal conduct.  In February 2014, Baltimore Ravens running back Ray 
Rice was arrested for domestic violence after a video was released showing 
Rice punching his then-fiancée, Janay Palmer, and knocking her 
unconscious.6  Shortly after Rice’s arrest, Vikings running back Adrian 
Peterson was arrested for child abuse after beating his young son with a tree 
                                                 
1. Catherine Taibi, Super Bowl XLIX Was Most-Watched Show in U.S. Television History, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 2, 2015, 4:56 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/02/02/super-
bowl-tv-ratings-2015-patriots-seahawks_n_6595690.html [https://perma.cc/FF9M-QUFZ]. 
2. Abigail Tracy, NFL, NBA Lead Arrest Rates Across Pro Sports, VOCATIV (Sept. 15, 
2014, 11:31 AM), http://www.vocativ.com/culture/sport/nfl-arrest-rates [https://perma.cc/4ZZJ-
9JER]. 
3. Id. 
4. NFL Player Arrests, USA TODAY, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/nfl/arrests/2014/all/
all/ [https://perma.cc/H7AH-HRMB]. 
5. Meghan Keneally, How the NFL Has Punished Players Arrested for Domestic Violence, 
ABC NEWS (Sept. 19, 2014, 2:14 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/US/nfl-punished-players-arrested-
domestic-violence-goodell-era/story?id=25534452 [https://perma.cc/N6NJ-WGFB]. 
6. Louis Bien, A Complete Timeline of the Ray Rice Assault Case, SBNATION (Nov. 28, 
2014, 2:08 PM), http://www.sbnation.com/nfl/2014/5/23/5744964/ray-rice-arrest-assault-
statement-apology-ravens [https://perma.cc/XE9M-7XNS]. 
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branch.7  In the face of these high-profile domestic violence cases, major 
sponsors such as Procter & Gamble, PepsiCo, and Anheuser-Busch 
expressed concern over the NFL’s handling of these allegations.8   
Consequently, NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell began taking 
affirmative steps towards reshaping the NFL’s image.  In an attempt to regain 
public favor and protect the League’s brand, the NFL hired PR guru and 
former sex-crimes prosecutor Lisa Friel as an image consultant.9  The League 
also hired domestic violence experts Jane Randel and Rita Smith as senior 
advisors to “help lead and shape the NFL’s policies and programs relating to 
domestic violence and sexual assault.”10 Goodell stepped forward to 
apologize for the League’s handling of domestic violence, and pledged to 
“get it right.”11  He then announced the implementation of new personal 
conduct policies and noted the importance of the U.S. legal system, saying, 
“[w]e do not have a clear and consistent policy that allows us to deal with 
the issues that are arising . . . .  Our country has a legal system that everyone 
needs to respect.”12  In August 2014, the NFL issued a statement announcing 
the implementation of new additions to the Personal Conduct Policy (PCP).13  
Commissioner Goodell’s pledge not only addressed the public’s immediate 
concerns; it also altered the landscape of the NFL’s disciplinary system.14  
                                                 
7. Steve DiMatteo, A Timeline of the Adrian Peterson Child Abuse Case, SBNATION (Sept. 
17, 2014, 12:22 PM), http://www.sbnation.com/2014/9/17/6334793/adrian-peterson-child-abuse-
statement-vikings-timeline [https://perma.cc/LU2T-6NK8]. 
8. Aaron Pero, NFL Loses Big Sponsor over Domestic Violence Problems, KRON4 (Sept. 
19, 2014, 12:07 PM), http://kron4.com/2014/09/19/nfl-loses-big-sponsor-over-domestic-violence-
problems/ [https://perma.cc/BT9H-QUMM]. 
9. Jane McManus, Domestic Violence and the NFL: What Impact Has the League Made?, 
ESPN (Jan. 28, 2015),  http://www.espn.com/espnw/news-commentary/article/12235694/impact-
league-made [https://perma.cc/J5DQ-K4YG]. 
10. Roger Goodell Breaks Silence on Domestic Abuse: “I Will Get It Right”, CBS NEWS 
(Sept. 19, 2014, 3:19 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/roger-goodell-breaks-silence-on-
domestic-abuse-i-will-get-it-right/ [https://perma.cc/MWV2-C9ZF]. 
11. Id. 
12. Id. 
13. The NFL’s Response to Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault, NFL.COM (Dec. 5, 
2014, 10:57 PM), https://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap3000000439286/article/the-nfls-response-
to-domestic-violence-and-sexual-assault [https://perma.cc/W389-MBAQ]. 
14. Id. 
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From then forward, Goodell was in the position to oversee every single 
personal conduct case with the power to decide guilt and penalties.15 
The issue now facing the League is that Commissioner Goodell is able 
to mandate player punishments in a seemingly arbitrary and unchecked 
exercise of power.16  In this capacity, “the employed Commissioner 
represents an almost autonomous authority within the internal structure of 
the [L]eague, uncontrolled by its principal owners.”17  Given the public 
response to cases such as Rice’s, Goodell faces pressure to dole out longer 
suspensions and heavier fines.18  This note contends that Goodell’s power to 
punish, though broad, is both a necessary means to protect the NFL’s brand 
and a channel of alternative justice that operates outside of the U.S. legal 
system.  Part II of this Article will outline the history of the NFL’s PCP.  Part 
III will analyze judicial decisions that have affected the League, including 
arbitration decisions that confirm and uphold the Commissioner’s power to 
create and implement player punishments.  Finally, Part IV proposes 
alternative ways in which Goodell can use his powers to rectify the violence 
plaguing the League and its players. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15. Id. 
16. See Joshua S.E. Lee & Jaimie K. McFarlin, Sports Scandals from the Top-Down: 
Comparative Analysis of Management, Owner, and Athletic Discipline in the NFL & NBA, 23 
JEFFERY S. MOORAD SPORTS L.J. 69, 102 (2016). 
17. Id. (quoting Gregor Lentze, Comment, The Legal Concept of Professional Sports 
Leagues: The Commissioner and an Alternative Approach from a Corporate Perspective, 6 MARQ. 
SPORTS L.J. 65, 72 (1995)). 
18. See Greg A. Bedard, The Right Thing—Finally, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Sept. 8, 2014), 
https://mmqb.si.com/2014/09/08/ray-rice-video-cut-by-ravens-suspended-by-nfl [https://
perma.cc/EG3S-8SRS]. 
PETERSEN 5/29/2018  1:01 AM 
2017] Judge, Jury, and Executioner 121 
II. THE HISTORY OF PERSONAL CONDUCT POLICIES AND DISCIPLINE IN 
THE NFL 
A. The Formation of the Violent Crime Policy 
The NFL was founded on September 17, 1920, in Canton, Ohio.19  At 
the time of its creation, the NFL did not construct a PCP for its players.20  In 
fact, the League did not institute a PCP until 1997, seventy-seven years after 
its founding.21 The League generally ignored the issue of player conduct off 
the field, and issues involving violent crime, such as rape, murder, assault, 
and domestic violence, largely went unpublicized.  Players’ personal conduct 
issues continued to be mostly unnoticed by the public until 1994, when the 
murders of Nicole Brown, the ex-wife of former professional player O.J. 
Simpson, and Ron Goldman, Brown’s then-boyfriend, became a catalyst.22  
Within weeks of the infamous Brown-Goldman murders,23 the NFL 
sent counselors to twenty-eight team training camps to discuss domestic 
violence with players for the first time in the League’s history.24  Though the 
NFL had not previously acknowledged a growing violence problem amongst 
players, League employees and former players noted that the issue had long 
been present.25  The then-head of the NFL Employee Assistance Program, 
Lem Burnham, said that the lectures had not been prompted by the murders, 
but that the issue had been on his “laundry list of things to cover . . . because 
[he] was aware long before the Simpson case of what an insidious problem 
                                                 
19. NFL Founded in Canton, PRO FOOTBALL HALL OF FAME (Jan. 1, 2005), https://
www.profootballhof.com/news/nfl-founded-in-canton/ [https://perma.cc/3GNY-BADP]. 
20. See Karisa Maxwell, A Beginner’s Guide to Understanding the NFL Personal Conduct 
Policy, BROADLY. (Dec. 8, 2015, 8:00 AM), https://broadly.vice.com/en_us/article/a-beginners-
guide-to-understanding-the-nfl-personal-conduct-policy [http://archive.is/L633t]. 
21. Id. 
22. See Bill Brubaker, Violence in Football Extends Off Field, WASH. POST (Nov. 13, 
1994),  https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1994/11/13/violence-in-football-
extends-off-field/8247f13e-54aa-4285-8918-d7f7856690cf/ [https://perma.cc/PN8P-N662]. 
23. Simpson was acquitted of the murders.  See O.J. Simpson Acquitted, HISTORY, https://
www.history.com/this-day-in-history/o-j-simpson-acquitted [https://perma.cc/9T54-M49D]. 
24. Brubaker, supra note 22. 
25. See id. 
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this is.”26  Burnham may have been alluding to a domestic violence charge 
filed against Simpson five years before the Brown-Goldman murders.  In 
early 1989, Simpson was involved in a disturbing domestic incident with 
Brown, where Simpson punched, kicked, and slapped Brown, pulled her 
hair, and threatened to kill her.27  Simpson slapped Brown with such force 
that he left a visible handprint on her neck.28  Neighbors found Brown hiding 
in bushes, bruised, crying, and repeating that Simpson would kill her, and 
Brown apparently told officers: “[y]ou never do anything about him.  You 
talk to him and leave.”29  Simpson did not receive jail time and instead was 
allowed to receive counseling over the phone from a psychiatrist of his 
choosing.30  
Though Burnham made reference to the “insidious national problem” 
of domestic violence, he then added that domestic violence in the NFL was 
not as bad as the public believed and was overblown by the “media circus.”31  
Burnham said he believed that domestic violence was a societal issue that 
should be governed by the courts.32  He announced that “gambling and drug 
[disciplinary] policies were instituted because they have a direct and 
detrimental effect on the game itself . . . .  But this domestic violence thing 
is different.  It’s a society thing and there are laws that govern it.”33  
Three years after the murders of Brown and Goldman, the NFL adopted 
the first PCP under then-Commissioner Paul Tagliabue, known as the 
Violent Crime Policy (VCP).34  Until the VCP was adopted, murder was the 
                                                 
26. Id. 
27. Josh Meyer, Police Records Detail 1989 Beating That Led to Charge, L.A. TIMES (June 
17, 1994), http://articles.latimes.com/1994-06-17/news/mn-5290_1_jail-time [https://perma.cc/
SN8D-22K3]. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. 
31. Brubaker, supra note 22. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. 
34. Maleaha L. Brown, Comment, When Pros Become Cons: Ending the NFL’s History of 
Domestic Violence Leniency, 50 FAM. L.Q. 193, 197 (2016). 
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only offense that barred a player from playing.35  The VCP allowed the 
Commissioner to either suspend or fine any player who had been charged 
with a “crime of violence.”36  The VCP also allowed the Commissioner to 
mandate clinical evaluations and counseling for players charged with any 
such crime.37  However, a Commissioner’s action was limited under the 
VCP: the Commissioner could not impose any punishment until the criminal 
justice system had done so first.38  This meant that players could go 
unpunished for violent crimes.  Although the VCP was the NFL’s first step 
towards a proactive anti-violence policy, player punishments were still 
lacking.39  Commissioner Tagliabue did not suspend a player for a domestic 
violence charge until 2000, three years after the League enacted the VCP.40 
B. Roger Goodell’s Election and the 2007 Personal Conduct Policy 
In August 2006, Roger Goodell was elected to succeed Commissioner 
Tagliabue.41 Goodell had been working as the Chief Operating Officer of the 
NFL at the time of his election and had spent twenty-four years working with 
the League.42  Goodell was elected unanimously by the League’s thirty-two 
team owners.43  
                                                 
35. Id. 
36. Suzanne Janusz, Comment, The NFL’s Strict Enforcement of Its Personal Conduct 
Policy for Crimes Against Women: A Useful Tool for Combatting Violence or an Attempt to Punish 
Morality?, 22 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 93, 119 (2012). 
37. Id. 
38. Brown, supra note 34, at 197. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. 
41. Mark Maske, Owners Pick Goodell as NFL Commissioner, WASH. POST (Aug. 9, 
2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/08/08/AR2006080801043. 
html [https://perma.cc/9ZP7-4MTW]. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. 
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The year Goodell became Commissioner, arrest rates of NFL players 
soared.44  Between March 2006 and March 2007, sixty-three NFL players 
were arrested, amounting to a sixty-six percent increase in arrests from the 
previous year.45  In response to the dramatic increase in arrests, Goodell 
announced that the NFL would be implementing a new, strengthened PCP.46  
The 2007 PCP prohibited players under contract from engaging in certain 
conduct.47  The text provided, “[i]t will be considered conduct detrimental 
for Covered Persons to engage in . . . violent and/or criminal activity.”48  
While the text did not explicitly define “violent and/or criminal activity,” the 
policy provided illustrative examples, such as sex offenses, crimes involving 
actual or threatened physical violence, and domestic violence.49  Those who 
engaged in such detrimental conduct would be subject to fines or suspensions 
at the discretion of the Commissioner.50  The 2007 PCP thereby amended 
and expanded the power of the Commissioner to establish punishments 
because it no longer called for criminal prosecution as a prerequisite to 
disciplinary action.51  
The range of Commissioner Goodell’s disciplinary power under the 
2007 PCP derived from the 2006 Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA).52  
In 2006, the National Football League Management Council, as the sole 
representative of the NFL, entered into the agreement with the National 
Football League Players Association (NFLPA), which is the sole 
                                                 
44. Janusz, supra note 36, at 108. 
45. Id. 
46. David C. Weiss, Comment, How Terrell Owens, Collective Bargaining, and Forfeiture 
Restrictions Created a Moral Hazard that Caused the NFL Crime Wave and What It Meant for 
Michael Vick, 15 SPORTS LAW. J. 279, 281 (2008). 
47. NFL Personal Conduct Policy, ESPN (Mar. 13, 2007), http://www.espn.com/nfl/news/
story?id=2798214 [https://perma.cc/U9GD-WSP2]. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. 
51. Brown, supra note 34, at 197. 
52. Joshua S.E. Lee & Jaimie K. McFarlin, Sports Scandals from the Top-Down: 
Comparative Analysis of Management, Owner, and Athletic Discipline in the NFL & NBA, 23 
JEFFERY S. MOORAD SPORTS L.J. 69, 81 (2016). 
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representative of present and future employee-players.53  Article XI of the 
CBA established that the Commissioner had the right to determine the 
punishment for off-field conduct “detrimental to the integrity of, or public 
confidence in, the game of professional football.”54  However, such 
punishments could not exceed the scope of the “Club Discipline” outlined in 
article VIII of the CBA, which limited suspensions to four weeks and fines 
to $14,000.55  
NFL players openly opposed the 2007 PCP.56  Atlanta Falcons wide 
receiver Roddy White called Goodell’s exercise of power a “dictatorship.”57  
However, despite the expansion of Commissioner Goodell’s power to 
discipline players, some evidence shows that the 2007 PCP was ineffective.  
Arrests actually increased after the policy was put into place.58  From January 
1, 2000 to April 10, 2007, 324 players were arrested, but from April 10, 2007 
to July 2, 2013, with the new PCP in place, 340 players were arrested.59  On 
average, approximately ten more arrests were made per year since the 2007 
PCP was put in place.60  From the time of Goodell’s election in 2006 through 
2014, NFL players were involved in 57 reported cases of alleged domestic 
violence.61   
                                                 
53. NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement pmbl. (Mar. 8, 2006), http://static.nfl.com/
static/content/public/image/cba/nfl-cba-2006-2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/4RD6-YTUT] 
[hereinafter 2006 CBA]. 
54. Id. at art. XI, § 1(a). 
55. Id. at art. VIII, § 1(a). 
56. Christopher Hansen, Is Roger Goodell’s Personal Conduct Policy Working?, 
BLEACHER REPORT (July 2, 2013), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1691244-is-roger-goodells-
personal-conduct-policy-working [https://perma.cc/9MDB-WDJR]. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
61. Meghan Keneally, How the NFL Has Punished Players Arrested for Domestic 
Violence, ABC NEWS (Sept. 19, 2014, 2:14 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/US/nfl-punished-players-
arrested-domestic-violence-goodell-era/story?id=25534452 [https://perma.cc/N6NJ-WGFB]. 
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In addition to increased arrest rates, there was evidence that Goodell 
actively avoided exercising his disciplinary power and enforcing the PCP.62  
For instance, he suspended Pittsburgh Steelers Quarterback Ben 
Roethlisberger for six games after being accused of sexual assault, but the 
penalty was subsequently reduced to only four games.63  Furthermore, 
Goodell was quiet on the issue of punishment in June 2013 when Cincinnati 
Bengals cornerback Adam Jones assaulted a bar patron despite the fact that 
Jones already had multiple offenses.64  Goodell also gave first time offenders 
free passes, allowing them to continue playing unless the available facts 
indicated “egregious circumstances, significant bodily harm, or risk to 
others.”65  On the surface, the 2007 PCP may have appeared to be an attempt 
to correct the growing problem of off-field violent conduct in the NFL.  
However, the CBA’s limitations on Goodell’s power, coupled with his 
leniency in enforcing player punishments, rendered the 2007 PCP an 
ineffective deterrent against violent behavior. 
C. The 2014 Personal Conduct Policy Communications 
The NFL unveiled its most recent update to the PCP in August 2014.66  
Following the public outcry and widespread media coverage of the Ray Rice 
and Adrian Peterson cases, Commissioner Goodell sent a letter to NFL team 
owners outlining new, stiffer penalties than those in the 2007 PCP.67  In his 
letter to NFL owners, Goodell stressed the effect domestic violence would 
have on the League, writing: 
Although the NFL is celebrated for what happens on the field, we 
must be equally vigilant in what we do off the field.  At times, 
                                                 
62. See generally Ben Roethlisberger, Quarterback, Twice Accused of Sexual Assault, 
BROADLY. (Dec. 8, 2015, 8:00 PM), https://broadly.vice.com/en_us/article/ben-roethlisberger-
quarterback-twice-accused-of-sexual-assault [http://archive.is/IGlW2]. 
63. Id. 
64. Hansen, supra note 56. 
65. Id. 
66. Katie Sharp, NFL Announces New Domestic Violence Policy, SBNATION (Aug. 28, 
2014, 4:06 PM), https://www.sbnation.com/nfl/2014/8/28/6079465/nfl-announces-new-domestic-
violence-policy [https://perma.cc/4UU3-ZQM8]. 
67. Id. 
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however, and despite our best efforts, we fall short of our goals.  
We clearly did so in response to a recent incident of domestic 
violence. . . .  My disciplinary decision led the public to question 
our sincerity . . . .  Simply put, we have to do better.  And we will.  
The public response reinforced my belief that the NFL is held to 
a higher standard, and properly so.68 
The 2014 PCP subjects players to heightened punishments compared 
to those included in the 2007 PCP.69  Any player who violates the PCP by 
committing assault, battery, domestic violence, or sexual assault will be 
suspended for six games, without pay, if the violation is a first offense.70  A 
more severe punishment may be imposed if the circumstances surrounding 
the violation are aggravated, such as the “presence or use of a weapon . . . or 
when the act is committed against a pregnant woman or in the presence of a 
child.”71  A second offense of this nature results in indefinite suspension from 
the NFL, and while a player can petition for reinstatement to the League after 
a period of one year, there is no guarantee the petition will be granted.72  
Consistent with the 2007 construction of the PCP, the 2014 additions provide 
that decisions on punishment and discipline are pursuant to a delegation of 
the Commissioner’s power.73 
 
                                                 
68. Id. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. 
73. Personal Conduct Policy, NFL (2016), http://static.nfl.com/static/content/public/photo/
2017/08/11/0ap3000000828506.pdf [https://perma.cc/C3FJ-4MK9]. 
PETERSEN  5/29/2018  1:01 AM 
128 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:2 
III. GOODELL’S POWER IN PRACTICE 
A. Limitations of the CBA 
Across all professional sports leagues, most player-commissioner legal 
disputes arise from issues with the league’s respective CBA.74  The CBA is 
recognized as the “supreme governing authority concerning employment in 
the professional sports league” and is controlled by the National Labor 
Relations Act (NLRA).75 Major League Umpires Association v. American 
League of Professional Baseball Clubs was the seminal case establishing the 
role of CBAs in professional sports.76  The case, brought by a unit of MLB 
umpires who sought to unionize,77 established the domain of the National 
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) over legal issues in professional sports 
leagues.78  In part, the umpires sought unionization following labor disputes 
regulated by MLB rules, which provided for final resolution of disputes 
through arbitration by the Commissioner.79  The umpires alleged a violation 
of section 9(c) of the NRLA,80 which provided that “whenever a question 
affecting commerce arises concerning the representation of employees, the 
Board may investigate such controversy.”81  Therefore, because the umpires 
alleged a violation of the NLRA, the dispute was subject to the jurisdiction 
                                                 
74. See Joshua S.E. Lee & Jaimie K. McFarlin, Sports Scandals from the Top-Down: 
Comparative Analysis of Management, Owner, and Athletic Discipline in the NFL & NBA, 23 
JEFFERY S. MOORAD SPORTS L.J. 69, 77–78 (2016). 
75. Id. at 78. 
76. Matthew J. Parlow, Professional Sports League Commissioners’ Authority and 
Collective Bargaining, 11 TEX. REV. OF ENT. & SPORTS L. 179, 197 (2010). 
77. Gregory Boucher, Baseball, Antitrust and the Rise of the Players’ Association, 4 U. 
DENV. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 121, 127 (2008). 
78. Id. 
79. Am. League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 180 N.L.R.B. 190 (1969), https://app.vlex.com/
#vid/43747677 [https://perma.cc/8CRZ-ZPEN]. 
80. Id. 
81. National Labor Relations Act of 1935, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449, 453 (1935). 
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of the NLRB.82  The NLRB found that the purpose and actions of MLB 
constituted interstate commerce since sports involved: (1) the exchange of 
money between teams located within different states; (2) team travel across 
state lines; and (3) Supreme Court precedent establishing football as a sport 
engaged in interstate commerce.83  As such, the NLRB was given statutory 
power to hear the dispute upon the conclusive finding that MLB engaged in 
interstate commerce.84 
Upon establishing jurisdiction over MLB, the NLRB found that the 
NLRA could legitimately apply to professional sports.85  The NLRB found 
that MLB’s construction of its employment system relied heavily on the 
Commissioner to self-regulate disputes within the League.86  However, 
because the NLRA was found to apply to MLB, the NLRB held that the 
umpires were allowed to unionize and that their union had the authority to 
negotiate a variety of employment-related subjects for umpires through the 
Collective Bargaining Process.87  While this case involved the structure of 
MLB, the consequences were far-reaching: the NLRB’s decision meant that 
the NLRA could be applied to all professional sports leagues.88 
Under American League, collective bargaining processes must comply 
with both fair employment practices and each sport’s respective CBA, which 
mandates requirements for hours, wages, and working conditions.89  For 
example, the current NFL CBA requires that the League and the players’ 
                                                 
82. See Eighty Years of Workplace Democracy, NLRB (2015), https://www.nlrb.gov/sites/
default/files/attachments/basic-page/node-1536/NLRB%2080th%20Anniversary.pdf [https://
perma.cc/K82X-AFXG]. 
83. Boucher, supra note 77, at 127. 
84. Id. at 127–28. 
85. Parlow, supra note 76, at 197. 
86. Am. League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 180 N.L.R.B. at 190. 
87. Parlow, supra note 76, at 197. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. 
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unions act in good faith.90  It prohibits player strikes, stipulates the rules of 
player drafting, and determines players’ salaries according to contract 
length.91  Once a players’ association and league representatives have 
engaged in arms-length negotiations and reached an agreement, negotiations 
will typically result in a finalized CBA that is effective for a specified 
number of years.92  Though American League established that CBAs and 
collective bargaining processes are subject to fair employment practices, 
legal disputes inevitably arise when CBAs affect player discipline.93  
B. The Legal Treatment of Commissioner Power 
Commissioner Goodell derives the power to punish players from two 
primary sources: the NFL CBA and the NFL PCP.94  Additionally, article 
VIII of the NFL Constitution gives the Commissioner the “full, complete, 
and final jurisdiction and authority to arbitrate [disputes].”95  Section 8.6 of 
article VIII gives the Commissioner further authorization to take appropriate 
legal action, or other steps, against players who engage in detrimental 
conduct.96  The NFL’s CBA defines this power in article 46, section 1(a), 
noting that all disputes arising from the Commissioner’s actions against a 
player are subject to the agreed-upon CBA processes.97  Finally, the NFL’s 
2014 PCP derives its authority from the League’s CBA but expands and 
defines the Commissioner’s power to discipline athletes for detrimental 
                                                 
90. See NFL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT (Aug. 4, 2011), https://
nfllabor.files.wordpress.com/2010/01/collective-bargaining-agreement-2011-2020.pdf [https://
perma.cc/A9JU-ZT7W] [hereinafter 2011 CBA]. 
91. Id. 
92. Parlow, supra note 76, at 198. 
93. Lee & McFarlin, supra note 74, at 80. 
94. Id. at 81. 
95. NFL, Constitution and Bylaws of the National Football League art. VIII, § 8.3 (2006), 
http://static.nfl.com/static/content/public/static/html/careers/pdf/co_.pdf [https://perma.cc/6BAS-
8FCQ]. 
96. Id. at Art. VIII, § 8.6. 
97. 2011 CBA, supra note 90, at art. 46, § 1(a). 
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conduct.98  Though the Commissioner’s power remains broadly established 
by these three documents, Goodell’s power as the “ultimate adjudicator and 
arbitrator of punishment” has been put to the test in four major cases over 
the past four years.99 
1. Ray Rice: Dealing a Blow to Goodell’s Power 
In February 2014, a domestic violence incident involving Ray Rice and 
his then-fiancée, Janay Palmer, occurred.100  After the release of video 
footage showing Rice dragging Palmer’s limp body from an elevator, Rice 
was “indicted for felony assault under circumstances evidencing indifference 
to the value of human life.”101  However, the court effectively dismissed the 
charges against Rice when it ordered a pre-trial intervention and determined 
that if Rice satisfactorily “completed an anger management course, attended 
counseling, and committed no further crimes,” the charges would be dropped 
within one year.102  
Rice met with Commissioner Goodell on June 16, 2014, for a 
disciplinary meeting.103  The NFL was aware of the indictment, had seen the 
video of Rice dragging Palmer’s body out of the elevator, and believed 
additional video footage existed of Rice assaulting Palmer earlier that 
evening.104  However, the NFL never requested the presumed additional 
footage, and Goodell only issued a two-game suspension and a fine of one 
week’s salary.105  Goodell responded to public backlash by implementing a 
revised PCP dictating a six-game suspension for first-time domestic violence 
offenders but told Rice that the new, harsher policy would not affect his 
                                                 
98. Lee & McFarlin, supra note 74, at 82. 
99. Id. at 84. 
100. Ray Rice, 1, 1 (NFL Nov. 28, 2014) (Jones, Arb.), http://static.nfl.com/static/content/
public/photo/2014/11/28/0ap3000000435652.pdf [https://perma.cc/BK9G-5QS7]. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. at 1–2. 
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penalty.106  However, when the additional video footage showing Rice 
punching Palmer in the face was released, Commissioner Goodell suspended 
Rice indefinitely.107  The NFL said the video presented “a starkly different 
sequence of events” that contradicted what Rice said at his June 16 
disciplinary meeting.108  Under article 43 of the NFL CBA, which provides 
for non-injury grievances, Rice appealed his punishment to an arbitrator.109  
Ultimately, Rice won his appeal.110  Former Judge Barbara Jones heard 
the appeal, during which the NFL claimed that the Commissioner Goodell’s 
expansion of Rice’s punishment was warranted after Rice “misled” him 
during the disciplinary meeting.111  Jones explored the first instance of 
discipline, noting that when Goodell decided upon the two-game 
punishment, he weighed Rice’s testimony, the decisions of the pre-trial 
intervention, and Rice’s acceptance of responsibility.112  However, Jones 
then cited to the arbitration proceedings where Goodell testified that in the 
face of public criticism, he felt Rice’s discipline was viewed as 
insufficient.113  Jones also noted Goodell’s testimony regarding his reaction 
to the footage of Rice punching Palmer.114  Goodell testified that he was 
shocked at the footage, calling it “violent” and “disturbing,” and claimed that 
it depicted a different series of events than those Rice described at the 
disciplinary meeting.115 
                                                 
106. Id. at 2. 
107. Id. 
108. Id. 
109. See 2011 CBA, supra note 90, at art. 43. 
110. Dan Hanzus, Ray Rice Wins Appeal, Immediately Eligible to Return, NFL (Nov. 28, 
2014, 3:03 PM), http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap3000000435623/article/ray-rice-wins-appeal-
immediately-eligible-to-return [https://perma.cc/SR4J-LH24]. 
111. Ray Rice, supra note 100, at 2. 
112. Id. at 5. 
113. Id. at 6. 
114. Id. at 7. 
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Jones ultimately set aside the NFL’s argument that Rice’s punishment 
was valid under article 46 of the CBA.116  During the proceedings, NFL 
counsel argued that article 46 of the CBA contained an implicit “just cause” 
provision that gave Commissioner Goodell the power to retroactively expand 
Rice’s punishment.117  Jones examined the text of article 43 of the CBA and 
determined that because article 43 contained an explicit “just cause” 
provision, the parties were aware of how to bargain for such a provision 
when forming the CBA.118  This, according to Jones, worked to “bolster[] 
the conclusion that it should not be read into [a]rticle 46.”119 
For Jones, the question then became whether Goodell abused his 
discretion in punishing Rice.120  Because there was no just cause provision 
in [a]rticle 46, the burden fell upon the NFLPA to prove that the imposition 
of the indefinite suspension was arbitrary.121  Jones found that there was 
sufficient evidence that Goodell and the League were aware of the domestic 
violence between Rice and Palmer prior to June 16, 2014.122  At the 
disciplinary meeting, Rice not only told Goodell that he struck Palmer but 
also physically demonstrated with his left arm how he hit her.123 Jones 
concluded that while viewing the actual footage of Rice striking Palmer may 
have “evoked horror” in Commissioner Goodell, Rice was truthful 
throughout his disciplinary meeting, rendering the indefinite suspension 
arbitrary and invalid.124 
                                                 
116. Id. at 17. 
117. Id. at 8. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. 
120. Id. (“For me, this means that the discipline determinations under [a]rticle 46 should 
be reviewed to determine whether the Commissioner abused his discretion, that is, whether his 
determination was arbitrary or capricious.  Where the imposition of discipline is not fair or 
consistent, an abuse of discretion has occurred.”). 
121. Id. 
122. Id. at 9. 
123. Id. at 10. 
124. Id. at 15. 
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The Rice decision dealt a significant blow to Goodell’s power.  The 
decision established that Goodell could not use article 46 of the CBA to 
retroactively impose harsher punishments pursuant to the 2014 additions to 
the PCP.125  But this decision would be overturned and contrasted against the 
following two cases: “Deflategate” and Adrian Peterson’s arbitration appeal. 
2. Deflategate: Inflating Goodell’s Disciplinary Power 
On January 18, 2015, the New England Patriots played the Indianapolis 
Colts for the American Football Conference title.126  After the Patriots 
defeated the Colts, the Colts grew suspicious and questioned the replacement 
of twelve footballs after the second-half kickoff.127  Colts linebacker 
D’Qwell Jackson noticed something unusual with one of the balls and gave 
it to a member of the Colts’ equipment staff, who noticed the ball seemed to 
be underinflated.128  The League began an investigation after it was reported 
that eleven of the twelve balls used in the first half of the game were 
underinflated.129  Patriots Quarterback Tom Brady made a public appearance 
on January 23, 2015, stating, “I didn’t alter the ball in any way.”130  However, 
after three months of investigation, League Investigator Ted Wells found that 
the Patriots intentionally used the underinflated balls to their advantage and 
that Brady was “at least generally aware” of the scheme.131  In the 
                                                 
125. Caroline A. Carmer, Article, NFL Management Council v. NFL Players Ass’n: 
District Court Deflates the NFL Commissioner’s Authority, 23 SPORTS LAW. J. 201, 206 (2016). 
126. Patriots QB Tom Brady Has Deflategate Appeal Denied by 2nd U.S. Circuit Court, 
ESPN (July 13, 2016), https://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/17045257/new-england-patriots-qb-
tom-brady-deflategate-appeal-denied-2nd-us-circuit-court [https://perma.cc/7CCQ-D43M]. 
127. Deflategate Timeline: After 544 Days, Tom Brady Gives In, ESPN (July 15, 2016), 
https://www.espn.com/blog/new-england-patriots/post/_/id/4782561/timeline-of-events-for-
deflategate-tom-brady [https://perma.cc/6JVL-H6DR] (“[A]fter the second-half kickoff, game 
officials replaced the 12 balls that were used in the first half with 12 backup balls that had been 
approved before game time, which drew questions.”  Two days later, ESPN reported “that 11 of 
the 12 balls used in the first half of the game were significantly underinflated.”). 
128. Id. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. 
131. Patriots QB Tom Brady Has Deflategate Appeal Denied by 2nd U.S. Circuit Court, 
supra note 126. 
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investigative report released by the League, text messages between the 
equipment assistant and the locker room manager were presented as evidence 
implicating Brady.132  Wells also reported that Brady refused to release 
records of his emails, texts, or phone records, which hindered the 
investigation.133  After these findings were released, Commissioner Goodell 
decided to suspend Brady for four games without pay, explaining that “there 
was ‘substantial and credible evidence’” showing Brady’s knowledge of the 
underinflated balls and that Brady “failed to cooperate ‘fully and candidly 
with the investigation.’”134  
The NFLPA and Brady appealed Goodell’s decision in arbitration.135  
Goodell exercised his power under CBA article 46, section 2, to oversee the 
hearing as arbitrator, and subsequently published an arbitration award 
affirming Brady’s suspension.136  Goodell published a 20-page opinion, 
stating that under article 46 “the hearing officer gives appropriate deference 
to the findings of the disciplinary decision under review; that is so even when 
the Commissioner serves as hearing officer.”137  Goodell defended Brady’s 
four-game suspension as a punishment consistent with similar collectively-
bargained discipline contained within the CBA, such as conduct punishable 
under the Steroid Use Policy.138 
Brady and the NFLPA moved in federal district court to vacate 
Goodell’s arbitration award.139  Brady argued that both Goodell’s 
punishment and subsequent arbitration award were invalid under the Federal 
Arbitration Act because Goodell exceeded his power as an arbitrator in 
                                                 
132. Deflategate Timeline: After 544 Days, Tom Brady Gives In, supra note 127. 
133. Id. 
134. Carmer, supra note 125, at 202 (citing NFL Mgmt. Council v. NFL Players Ass’n, 
125 F. Supp. 3d 449, 457, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)). 
135. Cole Renicker, A Comparative Analysis of the NFL’s Disciplinary Structure: The 
Commissioner’s Power and Player’s Rights, 26 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1051, 
1058–59 (2016). 
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137. NFL Mgmt. Council, 125 F. Supp. 3d at 460–61 (emphasis omitted). 
138. Carmer, supra note 125, at 210. 
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violation of 9 U.S.C. § 10(4).140  The court analyzed Brady’s claim under the 
umbrella of precedent concerning legitimate and illegitimate arbitration 
awards and examined whether the arbitrator’s award stemmed from the CBA 
since the arbitrator cannot issue awards simply based on his or her idea of 
what constitutes justice.141  The court found in favor of Brady and vacated 
the award, and the NFL appealed.142 
On appeal, the Second Circuit overturned the decision to vacate the 
arbitration, thereby rendering a verdict in favor of Goodell and the NFL.143  
The court reasoned that Goodell’s power was broad enough to authorize 
punishment for detrimental conduct and that his authority was legitimately 
bargained for and agreed upon by the parties involved.144  In its holding, the 
court awarded Goodell substantial power to determine player punishments, 
finding that Goodell was entitled to analogize Brady’s conduct to the CBA’s 
Steroid Use Policy in determining a parallel punishment.145  The court 
explained that nothing in the CBA or precedent demanded that Goodell find 
a more “persuasive” means of formulating Brady’s punishment, and thus 
Goodell’s determination was permissible.146  This decision affirmed 
Goodell’s broad discretionary authority to create player punishments.  The 
court further affirmed Goodell’s power by legitimizing Goodell’s decision 
to punish Brady under article 46 of the CBA.147  
3. Adrian Peterson: Reaffirming Goodell’s Power 
Commissioner Goodell’s authority and the validity of disciplinary 
action under the 2014 enhancements to the PCP have been challenged in 
court.  When Adrian Peterson was indicted on child abuse charges, the NFL 
                                                 
140. Id. at 462. 
141. Saint Mary Home, Inc. v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Dist. 1199, 116 F.3d 41, 44 (2d 
Cir. 1997). 
142. NFL Mgmt. Council v. NFL Players Ass’n, 820 F.3d 527, 531–32 (2d Cir. 2016). 
143. Id. at 532. 
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145. Id. at 540. 
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put him on an exempt list, meaning that Peterson would continue to be paid, 
but was prohibited from playing until the case was resolved.148  At the time, 
Peterson expected to be reinstated and allowed to play following his no 
contest plea.149  Instead, however, Goodell found that Peterson violated the 
PCP by engaging in “conduct detrimental to the game of professional 
football,”150 suspended him for six games and ordered him to pay six games’ 
worth of fines.151  As allowed under the PCP and CBA, Peterson appealed 
his discipline to a League-appointed arbitrator.152  The NFLPA, representing 
Peterson, argued that Goodell acted improperly in issuing the six-game 
suspension.153  The NFLPA further posited that Peterson’s punishment 
should have been limited to a two-game suspension under the PCP and that 
the League was “making up the process and punishment as it goes.”154  The 
arbitrator concluded that Peterson’s punishment was “fair and consistent,” 
noting that Goodell had the requisite discretion under article 46 of the PCP 
and that the August 2014 communications to the team owners reflected 
“current thinking on domestic violence.”155   
Peterson then appealed the arbitrator’s decision to the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Minnesota, seeking to vacate the arbitration 
award.156  The court found in favor of Peterson and the NFLPA, ruling that 
the 2014 communications created an entirely new PCP and that punishing 
Peterson under these communications was prohibited by the CBA.157  After 
                                                 
148. Ken Belson, Appeals Court Upholds N.F.L.’s Suspension of Adrian Peterson, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 4, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/05/sports/football/adrian-peterson-
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the district court handed down its decision, Goodell reinstated Peterson to 
play.158  Nonetheless, the League appealed the district court’s order to the 
Eighth Circuit.159 
The Eighth Circuit overturned the district court’s decision.160  This 
particular decision reinforced the notion that the Commissioner is not strictly 
bound to historical precedent in formulating punishments if the PCP does 
not provide sufficient deterrence against detrimental conduct.161  Further, the 
court disagreed with the NFLPA’s claim that the arbitration award was 
“fundamentally unfair,” a decision that affirmed the legitimacy of Goodell’s 
authority under article 46.162  The Eighth Circuit stressed that an arbitration 
decision that draws its essence from the CBA may not be vacated on the 
grounds it is unfair simply because the losing party is dissatisfied with the 
result.163  
The Eighth Circuit’s Adrian Peterson decision affirmed Goodell’s 
power to issue player punishments.  This decision, which interpreted article 
46 to give Goodell broad authority to punish players, gave Goodell the 
latitude to begin shaping the League’s response to issues of violent, off-field 
conduct. 
4. Ezekiel Elliott’s Punishment: Solidifying Goodell’s Power 
On July 22, 2016, Tiffany Thompson called 9-1-1.164  In a remarkably 
calm voice, Thompson stated she was calling to follow up on a previously 
reported domestic violence issue, and then requested an officer be dispatched 
                                                 
158. Id. at 993. 
159. Id. 
160. Id. at 999. 
161. Id. at 995. 
162. Id. at 998. 
163. Id. at 999; see also Hoffman v. Cargill, Inc., 236 F.3d 458, 463 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding 
fundamental unfairness vacates an arbitration award only to “arbitration schemes so deeply flawed 
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164. Diana Moskovitz, Here Are the Ezekiel Elliott Police Reports and 911 Call, DEADSPIN 
(July 22, 2016, 2:06 PM), https://deadspin.com/here-are-the-ezekiel-elliott-police-reports-and-
911-cal-1784138626 [https://perma.cc/67BA-JZT8]. 
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to her address.165  When asked who was involved, Thompson responded: 
“My boyfriend.  And he’s been doing it for the past five days.”166 
Thompson’s boyfriend was Ezekiel Elliott, the starting running back 
for the Dallas Cowboys.167  Prior to Thompson’s July 22 phone call, 
Thompson called the police on February 12, 2016, to report that her 
boyfriend had shoved her against a wall and injured her shoulder.168 Elliott 
allegedly perpetrated other acts of violence against Thompson.169  In the fall 
of 2015 he allegedly injured Thompson’s jaw when he pushed her up against 
a wall,170 and on a different day, he pushed her into a bathtub with such force 
that Thompson sustained a concussion.171  
The July 2016 incident between Elliott and Thompson differed from 
those in 2015.  Beginning on July 16, Elliott came to stay with Thompson in 
Columbus, Ohio.172  That evening, their interactions became violent when 
Elliott twice attempted to have sexual intercourse with Thompson and she 
protested.173  After the second time Thompson refused to have intercourse 
with Elliott, he threw her against a door and choked her.174  Thompson texted 
her aunt that week, calling Elliott “abusive” and claiming to have bruises “all 
                                                 
165. Id. 
166. Id. 
167. Id. 
168. Sarah Hardy, A Comprehensive Timeline of Ezekiel Elliott’s Domestic Violence Case, 
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over [her] body.”175  Thompson also sent her aunt seven pictures of the 
bruises on her body.176  Thompson later told police that on July 18 she and 
Elliott got into an argument during which he choked her.177  She also alleged 
that on the following day, Elliott threw her against a wall in her apartment, 
told her she was lucky “he has not killed her yet,” and slapped her across the 
face.178  Thompson further alleged that on July 21, the night before she called 
9-1-1, Elliott yet again turned violent.179  She claimed he threw her against a 
wall, grabbed her around the throat, yanked her by the wrist, and dragged her 
across the floor.180  The next day, on her twenty-first birthday, Thompson 
called the police to report the five incidents of domestic violence.181  
Despite Thompson’s forwarding of a total of twenty photographs of her 
injuries and bruises to authorities,182 the Columbus Prosecutor’s office 
decided not to pursue charges against Elliott.183  The Columbus City 
Attorney explained in a press release that charges would not be filed against 
Elliott due to a lack of sufficient evidence, citing conflicting witness reports 
and affidavits.184  But before the Office of the Prosecutor announced an 
investigation—before they had pictures of Thompson’s injuries or took 
witness affidavits—the NFL announced that it would conduct an 
independent investigation into the allegations.185 
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The course of the NFL’s investigation was rocky.  The NFL’s 
investigatory team put together a comprehensive report that compiled 
witness statements, pictures of injuries, phone records, text records, and 
doctors’ opinions.186  However, this did not detract from key facts that would 
call Thompson’s story into question.  Investigators and doctors found that in 
some of the photographs, Thompson actually had no discernable bruising 
and that in others, bruising was consistent with being hit with a “hard object” 
rather than a fist.187  There was also an issue with Thompson’s testimony 
since on numerous occasions, Thompson told police and prosecutors 
conflicting versions of events.188  Perhaps one of the more damning pieces 
of evidence to come to light during the NFL investigation was the testimony 
of one of Thompson’s friends who claimed that Elliott did not assault 
Thompson on July 22 and that Thompson asked her to lie to the police.189   
Other holes were poked in Thompson’s credibility.  Three witnesses 
signed affidavits stating that Thompson claimed she was going to “ruin” 
Elliott’s career.190  Thompson’s own phone records revealed that she and a 
friend exchanged text messages discussing the possibility of blackmailing 
Elliott using sex tapes of the couple.191  Despite the evidence of bruising and 
abuse that Thompson provided to authorities, the issue remained that her 
story and credibility were severely damaged throughout the course of the 
NFL investigation.  The NFL read the very evidence—or lack thereof— that 
caused prosecutors to refrain from filing charges against Elliott in a starkly 
different light. 
On August 11, 2017, the NFL publicly announced that Elliott would 
receive a six-game suspension192—the maximum punishment allocated by 
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the PCP—as punishment for his conduct.193  NFL counsel B. Todd Jones sent 
Elliott a letter detailing the reasoning behind his suspension.194  According 
to the letter, Goodell made the decision to suspend Elliot for six games, 
acting under his authority granted in article 46 of the NFL CBA.195  Based 
on the investigatory report collected by the NFL, as well as discussions with 
independent advisors and the Columbus City prosecutors, Goodell 
determined that Elliott had abused Thompson during the week of July 16, 
2016.196  
However, though Goodell’s decision to enforce punishment for 
domestic violence seemed to be in response to a long-unheeded call to action, 
Goodell’s decision has been shrouded in controversy.  Following Elliott’s 
suspension from the field, the NFLPA filed a suit on his behalf against the 
NFL.197  The NFLPA claimed that Elliott’s suspension was unwarranted 
because Elliott did not receive a “fundamentally fair” arbitration hearing 
during the investigation.198  Specifically, the NFLPA claimed that Goodell’s 
decision to punish Elliott was illegal, because “discipline is only warranted 
when ‘credible evidence establishes that [the player] engaged in conduct 
prohibited by the [PCP].’”199  According to the NFLPA, Goodell did not have 
sufficient credible evidence to support a finding that Elliott abused 
Thompson.200  During the appeal, testimony from Lisa Friel revealed that the 
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NFL’s lead investigator, Kia Roberts, did not think that there was enough 
evidence to prove Elliott abused Thompson and that Goodell was aware of 
her opinion before choosing to suspend Elliott.201  
Ultimately, the legal issues were resolved in Goodell’s favor.  The 
NFLPA, on Elliott’s behalf, filed two preliminary injunctions against the 
NFL with the intent of blocking Elliott’s suspension.202  Initially, a Texas 
federal court granted the NFLPA’s request for an injunction, but the decision 
was overruled following the NFL’s filing of a motion to stay in New 
Orleans.203  The federal appellate court found the Texas court did not have 
proper jurisdiction to issue an injunction because the NFLPA’s filing was 
premature.204  On October 16 Elliott filed a motion for a temporary 
restraining order (TRO) in the Southern District of New York.205  On 
November 9 the Second Circuit denied Elliott’s motion for a TRO, and 
Elliott’s six-game suspension was officially reinstated, rendering Elliott 
ineligible to play.206  Though Elliott had planned to appeal the decision in 
December 2017, he ultimately dropped the appeal in November 2017 and sat 
out five games.207  In announcing his decision to drop the appeals process, 
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his agents noted that Elliott’s decision was “in no way an admission of 
wrongdoing.”208  
The ultimate decision to uphold Elliott’s punishment—as well as 
Elliott’s decision not to appeal—reaffirmed Goodell’s power, the matter 
highlighted Goodell’s high-handed approach.  Allegations persist that if 
Goodell had not willfully ignored the dearth of evidence, his conclusion 
would have been different.209  Goodell, while taking a more progressive 
approach to the NFL’s issue with domestic violence, dealt a potential blow 
to the League, players, and victims of domestic violence with his decision to 
suspend Elliott.  Goodell sentenced Elliott to a maximum punishment for an 
incident about which there was no confession, as in the Adrian Peterson case, 
and no evidence that Elliott was actually the person who hit Thompson, such 
as the videotapes that showed Ray Rice assaulting Palmer.  
The League’s handling of Elliott’s case shows that Goodell may not 
have provided a fair hearing and may have ignored pertinent concerns 
relating to Elliott’s alleged innocence.  Responding to public outcry over the 
way the NFL handled past domestic violence issues, Goodell may have acted 
in an overzealous fashion.  Goodell likely alienated Elliott, his sympathizers, 
and Dallas Cowboys’ owner, Jerry Jones.210  By cutting corners in the NFL’s 
justice system, Goodell risks similarly alienating players and management 
alike.  
Perhaps more troubling is the fact that future victims of domestic 
violence committed by NFL players may bear the ultimate burden of 
Goodell’s rush to judgment.  If Thompson lied about being abused by Elliott 
and if Elliott was punished on the basis of such false evidence, Goodell 
would undoubtedly face intense public backlash.  Would a woman’s word 
ever be viewed as truthful again?  Would all women who accuse NFL players 
of domestic violence be perceived as doing it to exploit a player?  Would 
players be able to use Elliott’s erroneous punishment as a shield to deflect 
punishments for their own behavior?  If Goodell denied Elliott a fair hearing 
on the disputed issues, and it was revealed that Thompson’s stories were 
falsified and that Elliott was punished as a result, Elliott would be the victim.  
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Goodell would be viewed as the arbiter of guilt upon an innocent player 
rather than a champion for domestic abuse victims and survivors.  
Fortunately, there are progressive, legal, and comprehensive solutions to the 
NFL’s domestic violence problem that Roger Goodell and the League can 
begin to implement.  These are discussed in the next Part. 
IV. GOODELL’S POWER: A CHANNEL OF JUSTICE OUTSIDE THE CRIMINAL 
LAW SYSTEM 
A. NFL Players and Privilege: The Failures of the Criminal Justice 
System 
Based on the varying legal precedent explained above, Commissioner 
Goodell has established his power to create player punishments for 
violations of the PCP.  As discussed, following the 2014 additions to the 
PCP, Goodell has taken a strong stance against domestic violence and other 
violent crimes committed by NFL players.211  Although Goodell’s popularity 
among players may have decreased as a result of his increased power and 
harsher punishments, this newfound power can serve as a means of 
penalizing players who might otherwise avoid punishment under the 
criminal justice system.212  
Some research suggests that the problem of violent crime amongst NFL 
players may not change, but a stricter enforcement of the PCP may result in 
more player punishments.213  A 2015 study published in the Journal of 
Criminal Justice found that since 2000, NFL players were often arrested for 
violent crimes at rates well above the national average.214  The study, which 
defined violent crime as murder, manslaughter, aggravated assault, rape, 
battery, domestic violence, and child abuse, found that the total measure of 
NFL players arrested for violent crime between 2000 and 2013 was higher 
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than the arrest rates for twenty- and thirty-something year old men as a whole 
in the entire twenty-first century.215   
Some scholars have suggested that the NFL attracts those predisposed 
to violence because participation in contact sports fosters an environment of 
violence, attracting “hard-hitting” players who carry violence and aggression 
off the field.216  Further studies supported the notion that NFL players engage 
in a cycle of repeat offenses.217  However, overall, studies have been 
inconclusive as to whether the nature of the NFL, or football in general, 
encourages or makes it more likely that NFL players will perpetuate violence 
against women.218  
Regardless, it remains undisputed that violent crime, including 
domestic violence, remains a prevalent issue for players.  A particularly 
salient issue is whether status as an NFL player makes it less likely that 
players will be held accountable for their actions.219  Players might escape 
accountability due to the “privileged athlete hypothesis,” which proposes 
that professional sports players are conditioned to think of themselves as 
special—adored by fans and the public.220  This notion becomes distorted 
once players start to get into legal trouble during the course of their college 
careers since troubled players rely on coaches, athletic departments, and the 
police to help excuse their conduct.221  Once the players reach the 
professional level, they have become “accustomed to getting away with 
behavior for which most people are held accountable.”222  
Overall, professional athletes are less likely to be convicted of violent 
crimes than non-athletes.223  For example, though Greg Hardy, “a star 
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defensive end then with the NFL’s Carolina Panthers,” was arrested in 2015 
for the assault of his former girlfriend, Nicole Holder, he never faced 
prosecution.224  In 2014, Holder was stopped by police in Charlotte, North 
Carolina.225  Holder explained to officers, through tears, that Hardy had 
thrown her against a bathtub wall, tossed her onto a sofa that was covered in 
assault rifles, and then proceeded to choke her to the point where she 
believed he would kill her.226  Despite evidence supporting Holder’s claims, 
including police reports, interview transcripts, and a dozen photographs of 
bruises that covered almost all of Holder’s body, the charges against Hardy 
were dismissed and expunged.227  Hardy went on to sign with the Dallas 
Cowboys, and the team’s owner, Jerry Jones, called him a “real leader” who 
has the respect of all of his teammates.228  Hardy’s case is not unique: O.J. 
Simpson never served jail time for beating Nicole Brown,229 Ray Rice 
escaped jail time for assaulting his fiancée,230 and Adrian Peterson never 
served time for child abuse.231  
The problem extends beyond a failure to prosecute, with evidence of 
deliberate police interference in investigations involving players.232  In 2010, 
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a woman accused Pittsburgh Steelers Quarterback Ben Roethlisberger of 
raping her in a nightclub bathroom in Milledgeville, Georgia.233  Allegedly, 
the officer who wrote the criminal report called the accuser “a drunken 
bitch,” and further stated “[t]his pisses me off, that women can do this.”234  
During the course of the police investigation, surveillance videos of the club 
that evening were taped over and lost after the local police viewed the 
footage.235  Further, despite the presence of male DNA found when 
conducting a rape kit for Roethlisberger’s accuser, investigators withdrew 
their request for a sample of Roethlisberger’s DNA.236  And while 
Roethlisberger had yet to be proven guilty in a criminal court, the 2010 rape 
allegation came on the heels of a 2009 civil suit filed by a woman who 
claimed Roethlisberger raped her in a hotel room in Nevada.237  In 2010, in 
the same month Roethlisberger allegedly raped the woman in a club 
bathroom, another Milledgeville resident claimed Roethlisberger forcefully 
put his hand up her skirt.238  The two incidents in Milledgeville were never 
prosecuted; the woman who accused Roethlisberger of rape refused to 
continue her case past the investigatory stage, with her lawyer saying the trial 
would be intrusive after the already “unnerving” media coverage.239  
For women who are victims of violent crimes perpetrated by NFL 
players, prosecution and police investigations seemingly have failed to prove 
fruitful in the course of punishment.  Wives and girlfriends of players have 
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expressed, often indirectly, that the “privileged athlete hypothesis” is true.240  
Nicole Holder, when asked by police why she was crying, replied: “[i]t 
doesn’t matter. . . .  Nothing is going to happen to him anyways.”241  Holder’s 
sentiment echoed Nicole Brown’s sentiment in 1989, when she told police: 
“You never do anything about him. You talk to him and leave.”242  Dewan 
Smith-Williams, who was previously married to a NFL player, has said that 
women eventually believe there is nothing that can fix the cycle of domestic 
violence, and instead begin to focus on how to live with it.243  Female 
accusers also face widespread public criticism and victim-shaming for 
reporting issues of rape and domestic violence.  Because the alleged 
perpetrators are NFL players, the platform on which to criticize accusers is 
larger and more public than it would be for offenses involving private 
citizens.244 While the criminal justice system may fail to provide victims of 
violent crime with legal remedies, Goodell’s power may nonetheless serve 
as a channel to achieve justice.  
B. Proposal: Goodell Should Exercise Power Proactively but Fairly 
It has been approximately three years since the NFL introduced its 
latest PCP.  Under the 2014 guidelines, Goodell increased the length of 
punishments for players as well as the fines they face for violent offenses.  
These changes are meaningful because they force players to face 
consequences: although they may escape punishment under the legal system, 
offenders in the League may lose their livelihood.  Although Goodell 
instituted these measures to crack down on player misconduct, opportunities 
for Goodell to proactively, rather than reactively, address the NFL’s violence 
problems still exist.  Goodell has the power to create deterrents to violence 
that can work to educate players, rather than punishing them.  Goodell also 
has the power to reverse the culture of toxic masculinity within the League 
                                                 
240. See Kay-Phillips, supra note 216, at 81. 
241. Moskovitz, supra note 224. 
242. Meyer, supra note 229. 
243. Kay-Phillips, supra note 216, at 81. 
244. See A.J. Perez, NFL, NFLPA Clash over Alleged Reports of Blaming Alleged Victim 
in Ezekiel Elliott Case, USA TODAY (Aug. 16, 2017, 1:37 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/
sports/nfl/cowboys/2017/08/16/ezekiel-elliott-suspension-appeal-nflpa-dallas-cowboys/
572969001/ [https://perma.cc/JH8T-NWUY]. 
PETERSEN  5/29/2018  1:01 AM 
150 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:2 
that has fostered player privilege.  There are three possible solutions Goodell 
can utilize to achieve this. 
The first solution is simple: continue to enforce the player punishments 
and fines under the 2014 PCP.  Though punishing a player’s conduct may 
seem reactive rather than proactive, active penalization can serve as a 
deterrent for other players.  Players may realize that they will be subject to 
suspensions or fines if they witness other players being punished for 
misconduct.  Lisa Friel, “the NFL’s special counsel for investigations,” has 
spoken out about the construction of the 2014 PCP, noting the strength of 
the message it sends and its rehabilitative consequences.245  Friel notes that 
though there is always the threat of a lifetime ban from the League, the 
possibility of an appeal after a one-year ban offers a “carrot” that can be used 
to encourage players to rehabilitate their behavior.246  
The second solution is to create comprehensive, continual education 
programs.  The NFL began a domestic violence training program in 2015 
that required all League employees and players to attend a one-hour 
session.247  However, players with scheduling conflicts were allowed to 
attend the session via webinar, indicating a laxity in the League’s attendance 
policy.248  The training program, created by the League’s VP of Social 
Responsibility, combined the issues of domestic violence, child abuse, and 
sexual assault into one session.249  In response to the training, players voiced 
their opinions that the program just did not work.250  Players felt as if they 
were being treated as perpetrators prematurely, and one stated that he left the 
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seminar feeling guilty, despite having done nothing wrong.251  Consequently, 
treating innocent players as perpetrators from the start of educational training 
will serve only to alienate them, and will make them view the training as an 
annoyance rather than as a useful tool.  Additionally, it seems unlikely that 
a single one-hour educational session that combines a variety of such volatile 
issues will foster a lasting effect on players’ understanding of the issues.  
Ideally, a re-tooled education program would include the following: (1) 
the division of domestic violence and sexual assault education training into 
two separate programs; (2) the education sessions would last longer than one 
hour; (3) in-person attendance would be compulsory; and (4) the training 
would take place both before training camps begin and at the end of the 
season.  Additionally, the program’s presentation should be reconfigured.  
The education program would be more effective if the League hired speakers 
the players could relate to, such as players who have admitted to suffering 
from “privileged athlete” syndrome and abusing their partners.  For instance, 
the League could hire Vance Johnson, a former Denver Broncos player who 
admitted to abusing his ex-wife.252  Since 1996, Johnson has spoken out 
about domestic violence prevention.253  By hiring a former NFL player to 
educate players on domestic violence, players may find the program more 
effective because they can relate to the environment and mindset in which 
players like Johnson committed abusive acts. 
The third and final possible solution would be to write punishment for 
violent crimes into the CBA and to consider delegating Goodell’s power to 
oversee League disputes to an independent arbitrator.  In his capacity as 
arbitrator, overseeing player disputes with the League, Goodell should 
endeavor to strike a balance between the competing interests at the center of 
arbitration proceedings—especially since his decisions as an arbitrator can 
be overturned upon judicial review.  Though the interest in protecting victims 
is strong, Goodell should proactively defend arbitration decisions by giving 
players a fair hearing.  Ezekiel Elliott and the NFLPA highlighted this in 
Elliott’s 2017 case, claiming that Goodell did not allow Elliott access to 
testimony against him, which rendered him unable to deflect or counter 
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arguments and accusations.254  Judge Crotty of the Southern District noted 
that Elliott was “deprived of opportunities to explore pertinent and material 
evidence.”255  These issues, which seem to deprive players of fair 
investigations, hearings, and arbitration proceedings, render Goodell’s 
decisions vulnerable to legal contestation, since arbitration proceedings may 
be overturned where there is a “fundamental unfairness.”256   
Though the NFL does not function as a civil or criminal court, the 
League’s actions arguably deprive players of due process, since punishments 
will deprive players of a property interest—their salaries—and their 
opportunity to be heard will be impinged upon by a deprivation of access to 
information and evidence.  In these situations, players and the NFLPA could 
attempt to vacate arbitration proceedings on the grounds that the lack of due 
process provided by the League rendered the proceedings fundamentally 
unfair.  Although the arbitration process and Goodell’s powers are 
determined through the collective bargaining process, arbitration decisions 
are still vulnerable to judicial intervention.257  Due to the construction of 
article 46, courts have largely upheld Goodell’s decisions, but there could 
come a time when a judge does invalidate a decision due to fundamental 
unfairness; thus, posing a threat to Goodell’s decision to punish.   
As such, the League could opt to write punishment for violent crimes 
into the CBA.  Practically speaking, this step could not be accomplished until 
2020 or 2021, when negotiations for the League’s new CBA will take 
place.258  To create such a provision, the NFL and the NFLPA would first 
need to agree on what constitutes a violent crime—if domestic violence and 
sexual assault would fall under the same umbrella—and how these crimes 
should be punished.  Writing punishments into the CBA could eliminate 
disputes over the PCP since the NFLPA would have a hand in deciding what 
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punishments are acceptable as well as how disputes should be handled or 
arbitrated.  Allowing the players’ union to represent players in negotiations 
may quell concerns that Goodell wields too much power and helps ensure 
that players are not alienated by NFL policies. 
Conversely, players may not care about outlining punishments in the 
CBA or may actively oppose this solution, and this is where Goodell’s power 
comes into play.  Since Goodell wields so much power, he can use his power 
as a bargaining chip. As ESPN columnist Jane McManus notes, Goodell has 
a compelling reason to take a proactive stance on domestic violence issues 
since public opinion of both Goodell and the League plummeted in the wake 
of Ray Rice’s suspension.259  This could mean loss of viewers and sponsors.  
Acting proactively, Goodell could propose that in exchange for writing 
violent conduct policies into the CBA, he would appoint an independent 
arbitrator to oversee League disputes.  Goodell could also use his leverage 
to act on issues the League considers important, such as Human Growth 
Hormone (HGH) testing.260  Ideally, Goodell could insist for both HGH 
testing and the writing of violent crime policies into the CBA in exchange 
for forfeiting the ability to appoint League arbitrators. 
However, the question would remain: what would players really get out 
of this?  First, they would get a boost in public approval.  But the main appeal 
for players would be that Goodell, in this scenario, would be delegating some 
of his own power.  Considering that players regard Goodell as a “one man 
punishment gang,” this proposed solution might actually be the most 
appealing to players since Goodell would no longer have the final say in 
deciding punishments.261  As McManus writes, “removing him as the sole 
arbitrator of the justice league would be catnip to players.”262  The concern 
may linger that the NFLPA would take this opportunity to make punishments 
for domestic violence or sexual assault negligible, but in the face of public 
backlash and losing sponsors, the NFLPA needs as much positive PR as it 
can get. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Throughout his tenure as NFL Commissioner, Roger Goodell has 
established himself as a man to be feared.  Players who act unfavorably off 
the field will still have to answer to Goodell, regardless of what happens to 
them in the criminal justice system.  Goodell’s power to punish players has 
expanded and been upheld by the courts.  This Note examines the root of the 
domestic violence issue in the NFL as well as the history of commissioner 
power and the legal treatment thereof and concludes with a discussion of 
how Commissioner Goodell’s power can be used to combat the problem of 
violence in the League.  In the face of a criminal justice system that fails to 
hold players accountable, Roger Goodell may be the only source of justice 
for victims of violent crimes perpetrated by NFL players.  If Goodell wants 
to protect the integrity of the League, the sport, and its players, he needs to 
begin taking proactive, affirmative action and come out strong on the issue 
of off-field violent crime.  
 
 
